您的位置: 首页 » 法律资料网 » 法律论文 »

The SOE reform in China/周大勇

时间:2024-07-22 14:06:25 来源: 法律资料网 作者:法律资料网 阅读:8786
下载地址: 点击此处下载


The SOE reform in China
Zhou Dayong
Summer semester 2003
Europa-University Viadrina,Germany

Abstract:
The essay tries to study the process of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in China. Chinese economic reform resulted in significant influences on all social aspects, SOEs as an especially economic sector suffers a change both in internal management as well in the outside economic environment. I try to discuss in the essay, that the Chinese SOE reform has made large progress, however, SOE can’t conquer many problems by itself, the resolution of SOE lies in elimination of SOE by a further reform including property transition and construction of a fairer market.


Outline
1. History of the SOE reform in China
2. The main problems left in the reform
3. The reasons of SOE problem behind
4. Argue of some reform plans and suggestion
5. Conclusion


1. The history of the SOEs reform in China
1.1 the establishment of SOE
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power in Mainland China. One goal of the CCP was to lead China into a modern socialism society. In economic scale, it meant mainly industrialization. According to CCP’s policy, the form of industrial organization must be based upon state owned enterprises. The state-owned industrial system was set up by two ways. One was the new enterprise after the liberation. At the end WWII, most industrial sectors in China, such as communication network, transportation and power industry were destroyed and had to be rebuilt, at the same time, military industries and financial sector e.g. banking system was directly nationalized from the former control of Gongmin Party. Another way was transformation from the private ownership to state-owned enterprises. The private properties were regulated under state management, in some cases, for instance in commercial scale, the former private enterprises were bought by local government gradually. Till 1952, about 83% of industrial companies were controlled by the state; a socialism economic system was announced established. (Fig 1)
1.2 The reform began from 1978
Until Chinese economic reform began in 1978, public ownership in forms of state-owned and collectivized were only legal ownership of property. In industrial sector, the enterprises were controlled respectively under central or local governments, the latter made decisions for the enterprises, the enterprises were not profit seeking economic entities, they were simply workshops to execute centrally set policies.
In 1970s, the discontent of economic situation accumulated constantly, because the defects of central planning system became obviously more and more. Around 1978, the rural reform took place from grass roots and spread quickly, till 1982, the collectivized people commune had to be abolished. In company with the reform, the free market in a certain degree was developed. At the same time, the problem of lack of autonomy in SOE, which led to low efficiency, was also taken into account. Therefore, from 1978 on, the Communist Party, under the leading of Deng Xiaoping, put hand to solve the SOE problem. From 1978 to 1984, the efforts of the reform concentrated on giving the SOEs more autonomy by allowing them increased authority over the allocation of their profits, and limited production autonomy. The rest profits could be used either to finance increased investments or to pay bonuses to employees. Besides, administrative control over SOEs was decentralized to local governments. But as the prices were still centrally determined and SOEs did not realize the cost of their fixed and working capital, the reforms did not improve much the resource allocation or the utilization of capital. (1)

1.3 Contract is the main form in the second phase.
From 1985 to 1992 was the second phase of the SOE reform. The policy named Zhenqi Fenkai (separating government from enterprises), the central government decided to turn SOEs into truly independent production and management entities, and stipulate that enterprises must take responsibilities for their own profits and losses by means of contracts and leasing. The common practice was: the enterprises sign a manage contract with the responsible authorities. Under the contract, enterprises were not only allowed to retain the extra profits after they had fulfilled the contracted quotas, but also allowed to arrange their own manage including dismiss or enroll personnel. By the end of 1987, about 80% of state-owned industrial enterprises adopted the contracts system. In 1991, over 90% of the previously contracted enterprises signed the second round of contracts. Meanwhile, based on the first round contract practice, the content of the contract was improved; the authority introduced more rational norms to examine the fulfillment of contract. A multiple index system was formed, which included economic efficiency index, development potentiality index and management index etc.
During this period, the practice of shareholding reform appeared as well. This new creature was adopted at first by village enterprises, which come from the former collective enterprises. The village enterprises were always short of capital, so they raised money from the village residents. Along with the reform moved forward from countryside to cities, the shareholding system was also introduced into SOE reform. Early in April 1984 Chinese reform committee organized a seminar to discuss the exploitation of shareholding in SOE reform. That conference drew a conclusion that shareholding system is a rational way to restructure the collective and state owned enterprises in cities. In July the same year, the first shareholding company after Chinese liberation—Beijing Tianqiao department store (shareholding) came onto horizon. Till 1991, there were already 709 state owned enterprises restructured along shareholding system. These enterprises included industrial sector companies, trade companies, also financial enterprises, construction enterprises etc.
Besides, in the second phase of SOE reform, tax system had also a great change. Instead of handing in profit, SOEs paid a certain portion of tax according to their revenue level. The State and local government collected tax separately; this measure was implemented to loose the relation between SOE and local authority.
However, during this period, the SOEs showed their weakness in competition with the new developed private companies, joint venture companies and township and village enterprises, because at one side, the manager of SOEs didn’t get use to do business in a free market, the attitude of waiting, relying on government and begging for help were widespread. At another side, the relationship between government and enterprises became more complicated, because, although under the contract system, the government have no right to interfere in the SOEs management, they still rely on each other: the government need the SOE to have good performance in order to settle surplus labor forces and continue to play a role in maintain the social stability, at the same time, to increase the government’s revenue to deal with the raising infrastructure investment and other expense. The SOE, on the other side, need the protection of the authority, in order to obtain more chance to get loans, subsidizes or orders in government arranged projects. Besides, even though most of direct subsidies form the state have been cancelled, many domestic savings were also channeled into SOEs, because banks had been directed to take up the role of making "loans" to SOEs instead of the state. The total of non-performing loans has grown so large that it started to endanger the banking system. (2)

1.4 The MES is the key point in the third phase of the reform and the achievements
Form 1993 on, the reform moved into the third phase, the aim called setting up the modern enterprises system (MES). The Third Plenary Session of the 14th Party Central Committee in November 1993 proposed: "It is the inevitable request for market economy to set up modern enterprise system, it is a direction of the SOE reform of China. "This indicates that SOE reform enters a new stage of system innovation. In 1994 the State Council determined to chose 100 state-run large and medium-sized enterprises to launch an experiment to implement restructure along MES. The basic demands of the experiment were to "define right and responsibility clearly, separate government function from enterprise management, and operate scientifically”. Those requirements were in fact the basic characters concerning modern enterprises system. Along the policy of building MES system, and based upon the development of the whole economy, there were many achievements reached in the third phase.
1) By 2000, most large and middle scale SOEs have set up modern enterprise system tentatively. According to the investigation in 2473 enterprises of State Statistics Bureau 2000, 2016 enterprises have restructured, account 81.5%. Among those enterprises, 603 turned to Co., Ltd., accounts for 29.9%; 713 were restructured to limited companies, accounts for 35.4%; the number of solely state-owned company is 700, accounts for 34.7%. As for their management, 82.2% established shareholders’ meeting, 95.1% established the board of directors, and the board of supervisors has been established in 84.5% of enterprises. Therefore, corporate governance structure has already taken shape in SOEs.
2) In this phase, during" the Ninth Five-Year Plan", China began to adjust the state-run economic layout strategically, The idea called Zhuada Fangxiao (to grab the big ones and let the small ones go). The reform for medium and large SOEs focused on fostering a batch of trans-regional, inter-trade, inter-ownership big SOE groups through reorganizing, transforming, uniting annex. In 1997, the number of national large-scale enterprise groups expands to 120. For instance, under approval by the State Council, China Petrochemical Corporation, China Oil and Natural Gas Corporation were predominated to two large groups, whose assets of enterprise group reached in 40 billion dollars, such measure improved the intensification degree and international competitiveness of Chinese petrochemical industry greatly. Another example was in telecommunication market, six major SOE telecom groups (China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom, China satellite communication, China railway communication) were predominated. So a new form of competition in field of communication service took shape.
By the end of 2001, national key enterprises add up to 2710, total assets up to 1,280,450 million dollar. Among 179 super-huge enterprise groups, whose business income is over 500 million dollar, there are 165 state-owned or state-holding enterprise groups.
3) During this phase, separating government function from enterprise management was strengthened harder than before. Chinese government started administrative organization structure reform in 1998. Through this administrative restructure, the departments of the State Council reduced from 40 to 29. At provincial level, government departments reduced from 55 on average to 40, about 20% departments were simply. Some departments were cancelled totally. The cancellation of government departments indicated that the SOE stay in the charge of specialized official department manages changed completely. Meanwhile, the administration rank of the state-owned enterprise were cancelled, some administrative approval procedure were simplified.
4) To relieve the social burden of SOEs, re-employment service center were set up to shunt the redundant staff of enterprises. It has been a great difficult problem of the SOE reform from begin on that enterprises are overstaffed. It is an important measure of revitalizing the SOEs to dismiss and distribute workers. In June 1998, the state council required all regions to set up re-employment service center system. National Ministry of Labor and Social Security emphasized that the laid-off worker in SOEs must 100% enter the re-employment service center. The re-employment service center determined to provide serve functions such as grant basic living cost, withhold social insurance, organize job training and launch employment etc. for laid-off worker. The fund, which used for ensuring laid-off worker's basic life and paying the social insurance premium, come from financial budget, enterprise as well as societies (namely form contribution or from laid-off worker themselves), each part bears 1/3 of the whole fund. The re-employment service center provides service for laid-off workers for at longest 3 years. When they can’t reemploy after this period, can still enjoy unemployment compensation or the society relieve according to relevant regulation.
In this reform stage, re-employment service center played a positive role on maintain social stability. From 1998 to the end of 2001, 25,500,000 laid-off workers emerged (Fig 3) in national state-owned enterprises, among them more than 17 million people were reemployed, more than 3 million people retired. However, re-employment service center was only a transitional institute, because the SOE had to still take responsibility to settle down those laid off workers. According to a new policy, all laid-off workers after 2001 are treat as unemployed and have to enter free labor force market.
5) In order to extricate SOE from predicament, especially to resolve the problem of high liability-asset ratio, by December 2000, 580 SOEs began to implement debt-to-share swap, that mean the enterprises’ debt were recalculated as share (enterprises’ equity), so that the interest burden of SOEs were lightened. In the process, most of unperformed loans would be calculated as shares, which would be gathered and supervised by a new state commission-- State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Till 2001, the total amount of money of debt-to-equity swap account 40,5 billion dollars, and the result was that the average asset-liability ratio of debt-to-share swapped enterprises dropped from more than 70% to under 50%.

2. The main problems left in the reform
After three steps reform, the SOE acquired more autonomy, as we have seen, the whole economic circumstance were also better. But because the reform did not touch the socialism idea from begin on, thus the transition of ownership of SOE was left basically unchanged, the defects of SOE could not changed completely. In the context of China’s economic reforms, there are still a few problems in SOE sector existed and have also a deep influence.
First of all, the interventions from the government still maintained influence in SOE. The administrative relation between enterprise and government is still remaining. Even the Local State Assets management office was established, it belong to the same bureaucratic system like former authorities. It can appoint or remove senior executives of SOEs. If enterprise applies to the broad structure, the directors in broad are appointed by it. The office has also a say in the transfer of holdings, corporate mergers, closures or other major changes to the enterprises, it is also charged with the tasks of clarifying property rights and settling disputes (3) . It seemed that the state assets supervisory takes the place of former authority above the SOEs. Moreover, the local government maintains still strong power in local enterprise, they rely on each other as we discussed above. So long as the enterprises are state-owned, whether they are big groups, stock companies or little entities, it is difficult to shaking off the directly or indirectly control from the government.
Secondly, because of the long tradition, enterprises are still taking responsibilities for their employees in pension, medical areas, therefore the so-called “soft budget constraint” cannot be given up completely. Although we have discussed that the Chinese government has managed to start re-employment plan, SOEs also take a part of the fund to support the plan. Correspondenly, government had to shoulder some failures resulted from the mismanagement of SOEs’ and avoid from their bankruptcy, in order to prevent the enterprise from bankrupcy and thus endanger the social stability.
Thirdly, the management of SOEs has low quality compare with other economic sectors. Though SOEs have produced an average 10% growth rate in the value of industrial output during the period 1978-98, this rate is considerably below the average of other sectors. The problem has two reasons. One of them is lacking of the inner incentive of the managers. The SOE managers are not entrepreneurs in the true sense, but bureaucrats at any rate. Their appointment by the government not basically according to their managerial capability, but based on their rankings in the bureaucratic hierarchy through the politic system. Another factor concerns the supervision within the SOE, it is also lacking in most cases. In practice, the position of supervisor in a enterprise is normally taken by staff within the enterprise and in most cases, the position of president of the supervision committee is taken by somebody within the enterprise, who is under the leadership of the directors and managers in his ranks both at work and in the Party. This system makes it very hard for the supervision committee to fully perform its authority (4) .
Fourth, the high liability-asset ratio is also regarded as a fatal problem of SOEs. It was observed, that during the reform period, the liability-asset ratio of industrial SOEs rose from around 11% in 1978 to approximately 65% in 1997. In as many as one-fourth of industrial SOEs, liabilities have even come to exceed assets; these enterprises are in fact insolvent. The World Bank suggests that in debt restructuring may be necessary for the most heavily indebted enterprises to bankrupt. After the implement of debt-to-share swap, the ratio decreased, but the debtor, in most cases are banks, didn’t collect the loan back, so it made the SOE even harder to get new loan for production. (5)
Furthermore, the whole process of the SOE reform companied by a serials of social problems, in compare to some difficulties such as lack or reserve labor force, ageing of the equipments, the most troublesome is the unemployment in large scales. In addition, in rural areas, millions of flowing population has been produced because of the bankruptcy and low profitability of the township and village enterprise. In urban China there are frequent reports about workers’ unrest. Although until now China still maintain a relative political stability, the menace will not fade away in a short time.

劳动部关于印发《尾矿设施安全监督管理办法(试行)》的通知

劳动部


劳动部关于印发《尾矿设施安全监督管理办法(试行)》的通知

1995年4月21日,劳动部

各省、自治区、直辖市及计划单列市劳动(劳动人事)厅(局),国务院各有关部门、总公司:
为了加强对尾矿设施的安全监督管理,防止尾矿设施造成危害,经与有关部门研究,我部制定了《尾矿设施安全监督管理办法(试行)》,现发给你们,请贯彻执行,并将执行中的有关情况报告我部。

附件:尾矿设施安全监督管理办法(试行)
第一条 为了加强对尾矿设施的安全监督管理,防止尾矿设施造成危害,根据《中华人民共和国矿山安全法》和有关法规,制定本办法。
第二条 本办法中所称尾矿设施是指矿山企业选矿厂(车间)及其他生产过程所产生尾矿的贮存设施、浆体输送系统、澄清水回收系统、渗透水回收系统、排洪系统等设施。
第三条 本办法适用于国有、集体、私营矿山企业及其他形式的矿山企业尾矿设施。
第四条 根据尾矿设施可能造成危害的程度,对尾矿设施进行如下分类:
一类尾矿设施:一旦发生最大程度的溃坝事故,殃及居民区或重要建(构)筑物等,可能造成死亡50人以上或以济损失1000万元以上的;
二类尾矿设施:一旦发生最大程度的溃坝事故,殃及居民区或重要建(构)筑物等,可能造成死亡10人以上至50人以下或经济损失100万元以上至1000万元以下的;
三类尾矿设施:一旦发生最大程度的溃坝事故,殃及居民区或重要建(构)筑物等,可能造成死亡10人以下或者经济损失100万元以下的。
第五条 矿山企业应对尾矿设施的安全负责,并必须做到:
(一)有劳动行政部门参加并同意的设计审查和竣工验收报告;
(二)有由有关部门和专家对尾矿设施的安全评价和危害程度分类的资料;
(三)有由劳动行政部门授权的尾矿设施安全技术检测机构颁发的检测合格报告;
(四)有专管尾矿设施安全的负责人;
(五)有安全管理细则和必要的技术资料;
(六)有经常检查的原始记录;
(七)有对劳动行政部门、矿山企业主管部门检查和企业自查出隐患的治理方案和整治情况的记录;
(八)有灾害防范计划和措施。
第六条 矿山企业应按以下规定对尾矿设施进行经常检查:
(一)一类尾矿设施每7天一次;
(二)二类尾矿设施每15天一次;
(三)三类尾矿设施每30天一或两次;
在汛期或发生异常情况期间,应按实际情况增加检查次数。
第七条 矿山企业必须每年编制尾矿设施灾害防范计划和措施,并经上级矿山企业主管部门批准后,报相应的劳动行政部门备案;需要修改的防范计划和措施,修改后仍应按上述程序重新批准和备案。
尾矿设施发生异常情况时,应按照灾害防范计划和措施组织实施,必要时应报请当地人民政府及有关部门给予协助。
第八条 矿山企业应在发生特大洪水、暴雨、强烈地震及重大事故等非常情况后组织特别检查。在检查中如发现重大隐患,必须立即采取措施,消除隐患,并向上级矿山企业主管部门和相应的劳动行政部门报告。
第九条 矿山企业必须将尾矿设施需用的技措费或维护费纳入本企业安全措施费用计划,专款专用,任何单位和部门不得截留或挪用。
第十条 矿山企业主管部门按照所辖区域或企业隶属关系,对矿山企业尾矿设施的安全进行管理:
(一)检查矿山企业贯彻执行国家有关尾矿设施安全的规定、规程、规范情况以及尾矿设施安全管理和运行状况;
(二)组织新建、改建(包括改变筑坝方法)、扩建(增容)尾矿设施的设计审查和竣工验收;
(三)组织尾矿设施的闭库处理设计审查,对已闭库的尾矿设施进行安全情况复查;
(四)组织有关部门和安全技术专家对尾矿设施进行安全评价及危害程度分类;
(五)督促检查矿山企业对尾矿设施隐患的治理;
(六)法律赋予的其他职责。
第十一条 矿山企业主管部门应在每年汛前、汛后及北方冻融期,对尾矿设施进行定期全面检查,在检查中如发现重大隐患,必须向相应的劳动行政部门报告。
第十二条 矿山企业主管部门对在尾矿设施安全管理方面成绩显著的单位和个人,应该给予表彰。
第十三条 县级以上人民政府劳动行政部门对本行政区域内矿山的尾矿设施实施以下监督:
(一)检查矿山企业及其主管部门贯彻执行国家和行业所颁发的尾矿设施安全管理规定、安全规程和技术规范的情况以及尾矿设施安全管理和运行状况;
(二)参加新建、改建(包括改变筑坝方法)、扩建(增容)尾矿设施的设计审查和竣工验收;
(三)参加尾矿库闭库处理设计中安全维护方案的审查;
(四)监督矿山企业尾矿设施安全技措费用的安排和使用情况;
(五)参加矿山企业主管部门组织的安全技术专家对尾矿设施进行安全评价及危害程度分类;
(六)参加并监督尾矿设施事故的调查和处理。
第十四条 国务院劳动行政部门组织制定尾矿设施安全评价程序和危害分类细则。
第十五条 劳动行政部门必须对本行政区域内的尾矿设施进行现场检查,对一类和二类尾矿设施每年至少检查一次。检查后如发现重大隐患,应签发“矿山安全监督指令书”,并按有关规定要求限期整改、给予行政处罚或停产整顿。
劳动行政部门对尾矿设施的安全实行分级监督。
一类尾矿设施的监督由省、自治区、直辖市劳动行政部门组织施行,二类和三类尾矿设施的监督由地(市)劳动行政部门组织施行。一类尾矿设施的现场检查情况应报国务院劳动行政部门备案。
第十六条 由劳动行政部门认可的尾矿设施安全技术检测机构对指定范围内的尾矿设施定期进行检测。定期检测应按以下规定进行:
(一)一类尾矿设施在每年汛期前、冻融期必须检测一次;
(二)二类尾矿设施每年检测一次;
(三)三类尾矿设施每二年检测一次。
检测机构提出的检测报告必须报送授给其权限的劳动行政部门,同时送交企业。检测报告应作为劳动行政部门实施监督的依据。
尾矿设施安全技术检测的有关规定由国务院劳动行政部门制定。
第十七条 负责尾矿库库区和坝体安全巡查及维护的操作人员必须经过培训,持证上岗。国务院劳动行政部门负责制定培训大纲、组织编写教材、统一印制合格证书。矿山企业主管部门制定培训计划和组织培训,并把培训计划抄送相应的劳动行政部门。负责组织培训的矿山企业主管部门会同相应的劳动行政部门进行考核和发证。
第十八条 对违反本办法发生尾矿设施伤亡事故的有关单位和部门及其负责人,依照《中华人民共和国矿山安全法》及有关法规给予行政处罚;构成犯罪的,由司法部门追究刑事责任。
第十九条 省、自治区、直辖市劳动行政部门可根据本办法和本地区实际情况制定实施细则,并报国务院劳动行政部门备案。
第二十条 本办法自发布之日起施行。


信息产业部关于公布符合从事.cn域名注册服务条件的域名注册服务机构的通告

信息产业部


信息产业部关于公布符合从事.cn域名注册服务条件的域名注册服务机构的通告


依据《中国互联网络域名管理办法》和《信息产业部关于公布域名注册服务经营者应具备条件法律适用解释的通告》信部电[2003]498号,现将符合从事.CN域名注册服务条件且向我部办理备案手续的域名注册服务机构予以公布。
本通告相关内容可查询我部网站www.mii.gov.cn。本通告发布后办理备案手续的域名注册服务机构名单不再另行通知,一并发布在我部网站上。
对于发现的域名注册服务问题,欢迎社会各界向域名注册管理机构中国互联网络信息中心投诉(电话:010-62619750-3008;邮箱:supervise@cnnic.net.cn;传真:010-62559892/62636115),也可直接向信息产业部反映(联系电话:010-66020710,传真:010-66024197)。
特此通告。

中华人民共和国信息产业部
二○○三年十一月二十四日

附件:符合从事.CN域名注册服务条件的机构及其相关信息


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

符合从事.CN域名注册服务条件的机构及其相关信息


1、北京万网新兴网络技术有限公司
地 址:北京市东城区鼓楼外大街27号万网大厦3层(100011)
客户服务:800-810-8500 010-64242266
传 真:010-64254247
电子邮件:cndomain@hichina.com
网 址:http://www.net.cn/

2、北京信海科技发展有限公司
地 址:北京首体南路6号新世纪饭店写字楼1858室 (100044)
客户服务:010-68492333-1、68492333-2
传 真:010-68492758
电子邮件:cnreg@chinadns.com
网 址:http://www.chinadns.com.cn/

3、厦门精通科技实业有限公司
地 址:厦门市开元区嘉禾路267号惠元大厦八楼(361004)
客户服务:0592-5391800
传 真:0592-5391808
电子邮件:guonei@china-channel.com
网 址:http://www.china-channel.com.cn/

4、北京首都在线科技发展股份有限公司
地 址:北京市朝阳区东土城路14号建达大厦16层(100013)
客户服务:010-64240263-4
传 真:010-84291029
电子邮件:idc.bj@net263.com
网 址:http://www.263idc.net/index.html/

5、北京东方网景信息科技有限公司
地 址:北京市海淀区知春路63号卫星大厦1108室(100080)
客户服务:010-82615500-1237、82615500-5858、82615500-1600
传 真:010-68747667
电子邮件:support@east.net
网 址:http://www.east.net/

6、北京新网互联科技有限公司
地 址:北京海淀区花园东路10号高德大厦307室(100083)
客户服务:800-830-7110
传 真:010-82039663
电子邮件:cnreg@dns.com.cn
网 址:http://www.dns.com.cn/

7、广东互易科技有限公司
地 址:广州市天河北路233号中信广场1202-1203(510613)
客户服务:020-87521880、87521883、87521885
传 真:020-87502880
电子邮件:shitaluo@8hy.com
网 址:http://www.huyi.cn/

8、厦门必信电脑网络有限公司
地 址:厦门市湖滨南路388号国贸大厦41楼D座(361004)
客户服务:0592-5163169、5163200、8607568
传 真:0592-5165137
电子邮件:domain@bizcn.com
网 址:http://www.bizcn.com/

9、厦门中资源网络服务有限公司
地 址:厦门市白鹭洲路普利花园大厦19层(361004)
客户服务:0592-2222123
传 真:0592-2220123
电子邮件:web@cnolnic.com
网 址:http://www.cnolnic.net.cn/

10、珠海市天互科技有限公司
地 址:珠海市人民东路221号西海大厦6楼B座(519000)
客户服务:0756-2281172、2282523、2281173
传 真:0756-2282526
电子邮件:support@now.net.cn
网 址:http://www.now.net.cn/

11、武汉市劲捷电子信息有限公司
地 址:武汉市黄孝河路107号花桥互联网大厦15层(430019)
客户服务:800-880-1027/027-82890557、82649810-8328
传 真:027-82649681
电子邮件:info@jingle.com.cn
网 址:http://www.027.net.cn/

12、北京中科三方网络技术有限公司
地 址:北京市海淀区中关村南四街4号1号楼(100080)
客户服务:800-810-6660、010-82619977
传 真:010-82610500、82610330
电子邮件:sales@sanfront.com.cn
网 址:http://www.sfn.com.cn

13、北京中企网动力数码科技有限公司
地 址:北京市海淀区西三环中路甲21号企业网大厦(100036)
客户服务:010-63983732、63982266
传 真:010-63983401
电子邮件:service@ce.net.cn
网 址:http://www.ce.net.cn